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Objectives, Budgets, Thresholds, and Opportunity CostsȄA Health Economics Approach: An 
ISPOR Special Task Force Report 
 
 
Abstract  
 
The fourth paper of our Special Task Force (STF) ǯ
technology adoption or reimbursement decision, given the array of technologies, based on their 
different values and costs.  We discuss the role of budgets, thresholds, opportunity costs, and 
affordability in making decisions. First we discuss the use of budgets and thresholds in private 
and public health plans, their interdependence and connection to opportunity cost.  Essentially, 
each payer should adopt a decision rule about what is good value for money given their budget; 
consistent use of a cost-per-QALY threshold will assure the maximum health gain for the 
budget. In the US, different public and private insurance programs could use different 
thresholds, reflecting the differing generosity of their budgets and implying different levels of 
access to technologies. In addition, different insurance plans could consider different additional 
elements to the QALY metric discussed elsewhere in our STF report.  We then define 
affordability and discuss approaches to deal with it, including consideration of disinvestment 
and related adjustment costs, the impact of delaying new technologies, and comparative cost-
effectiveness of technologies. Over time, the availability of new technologies may increase the 
amount that populations want to spend on health care. We then discuss potential modifiers to 
thresholds, including uncertainty about the evidence used in the decision-making process. This 
paper concludes by discussing the application of these concepts in the context of the pluralistic ǡǲǳ-financed public programs vs. private 
programs.  
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Previous sections considered the elements of value at the individual and population level.  In this 
section, we focus on ĂŚĞĂůƚŚƉůĂŶŽƌƉĂǇĞƌ ?Ɛtechnology adoption or reimbursement decision, given 
the array of technologies, with their different values and costs. Assuming a payer or population 
perspective, what are the objectives and constraints?  We follow the Second Panel in recommending 
the cost-per-QALY gained (i.e., cost-effectiveness (CEA)) as the central measure for most of these 
decisions [1]. Our main focus here is on the use of thresholds, opportunity costs, and budgets in 
constraints in relation to decisions about technology adoption and reimbursement.  We briefly 
discuss the incorporation of a broader range of elements of value, particularly those related to 
equity, and this is then discussed more extensively in Section 5 [2]. 
 
In Section 2, we noted that two microeconomic approaches ? welfare economics and extra-
welfarism ? can each be used to justify a cost-per-QALY threshold for the inclusion of new 
technologies in the benefit package [3].  In a welfare-economics approach, tŚĞ “ďƵĚŐĞƚ ?ĨŽƌ each 
health plan is determined through market interactions of the buyers and sellers of health care 
insurance policies.  The buyers seek to maximize their utility allocating their resources (including any 
subsidies) between insurance to cover health care in the event of illness and to protect against 
catastrophic financial or health loss, and other, non-health goods. In a typical extra-welfarist 
approach, the size of the health budget of a public payer is determined through a political process in 
which taxpayers allocate funds to health versus other services. Public payer health budgets tend to 
be fixed in the short run and the primary aim is to maximize population health gain, subject to other 
modifiers, such as equity considerations.  In both private and public insurance contexts, the choices 
have opportunity costs ? some in the short run and some in the long run ? and short term decision 
making should take into account the longer term options and constraints. 
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In this section, we discuss the general application of these principles. However, as this Task Force is 
focusing on US value frameworks, we say more in Sections 4.5 and 4.6 about specific 
implementation in the US healthcare system, which is a pluralistic system with (a) some public 
programs that are expected to operate within fixed annual budgets and (b) many private plans that, 
to varying degrees, view their annual premium revenue as a target annual budget.  Hence, although 
implementation in the US health care system raises some specific issues, there will be some 
commonality in implementation with single-payer public health insurance systems such as the UK 
and Canada where budgets are fixed. 
   
Applying CEA for health sector decision making requires a decision rule. The most commonly 
recommended approach is for the decision maker to adopt an explicit or implicit  “threshold ? of cost-
effectiveness representing the maximum level of cost-effectiveness deemed acceptable for 
technology adoption and reimbursement within a given plan. The rationale for this approach is that 
consistent use of a threshold assures that health gain is maximized for the covered population, given 
the ƉĂǇĞƌ ?Ɛbudget.   For example, in England NICE has a threshold of £20,000 per QALY gained, with 
a range up to £30,000, but also up to £50,000 in ƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨ ?ĞŶĚ-of-lŝĨĞ ?ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚƐ.  As discussed 
above, health sector decision making typically considers more than just cost-per-QALY. In this 
section we discuss the role of budgets, thresholds, opportunity costs, and affordability in making 
decisions. Section 4.2 discusses the role of budgets and thresholds in private and public health plans, 
their interdependence and connection to opportunity cost. Section 4.3 defines affordability and 
discusses approaches to deal with it. Section 4.4 discusses potential modifiers to thresholds, 
including uncertainty about the evidence used in the decision-making process. Section 4.5 discusses 
application of these concepts in the context of the pluralistic US health care system, and Section 4.6 
discusses  “excess burden ? ?ĞǆƚƌĂŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚĐŽƐƚƐ ? of tax-financed public programs vs. private 
programs. The next section of the report, Section 5, discusses how a larger set of value elements 
might be weighted and aggregated into a more comprehensive, augmented CEA and how these 
elements could be considered as part of a structured deliberation, for example, using a form of 
MCDA.    
 
 
4.2 The Relationship among Budget Constraints, Thresholds, and Opportunity Costs 
  
The approach for determining the budget and threshold for a given year (or whatever the decision 
period) depends on the context.  The most straightforward case is a jurisdiction operating its health 
care system efficiently with a firm budget constraint on one or more parts of the health system that 
is fixed in the short run. In this context, the most appropriate short-run approach to defining the 
threshold is the opportunity cost of displacing existing covered technologies, since if a technology 
with a cost-per-QALY gained higher than the threshold were to be adopted, there would be a net 
loss in total health within the budget period [4].  In the longer run, ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?
willingness to pay for improved health would be relevant, to inform the discussion of whether the 
budget for health care should be changed over time. In this context, the forgone benefit of cutting 
back on non-health goods and services is the opportunity cost of increasing the budget for health or 
raising the threshold. Important to note is that the threshold, the budget, and the measure of health 
gain cannot be set independently of one another.  
 
If novel elements of value are added to the QALY measure of health gain, with no change in the 
budget, the threshold would need to be reduced because the average measured benefit of 
technologies would increase.   Although it might seem that using such an expanded QALY measure 
of health gain would argue for increasing the health budget, because certain indirect benefits of 
health technologies have been recognized, it is important to consider whether some of these types 
 3 
of attributes also apply to non-health spending. Investing in housing and education, for example, can 
create option value and can bring additional value to risk-averse people. Consideration of other 
attributes to augment the health QALY measure may require expanding the measure of the 
opportunity cost of health spending. The impact on consumer or taxpayer preferences about health 
budgets is uncertain a priori. There may also be a dynamic aspect to consider. If the budget and/or 
the threshold is expected to change significantly over time, then some account needs to be taken of 
the long-term cost-effectiveness of a technology to ensure health and related benefits are 
maximized over time. Furthermore, over time, as incomes rise, and/or technological change occurs 
in health care, and/or non-health opportunity sets change ?ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?willingness to pay for health 
and related benefits, and consequently the size of health budgets and threshold levels will change, 
as discussed below. 
 
In a US private market context where private plans (both employer-sponsored and not) compete by 
offering different levels of coverage, more generous coverage implies a higher threshold and a 
higher premium and budget.  Thus the threshold could be a convenient summary of coverage 
generosity that could be informative for consumers seeking to choose between plans. In this private 
market context, ĞŶƌŽůůĞĞƐ ?ǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽƉĂǇ (WTP) premiums would reflect the WTP for health gain 
(and other health-related attributes) ĂŶĚĚĞĨŝŶĞƚŚĞƉĂǇĞƌ ?ƐďƵĚŐĞƚĨŽƌƚŚĞǇĞĂƌ. In theory, market 
sorting would result in consumers (or employees) enrolling into plans that best match their 
preferences and WTP for health. In practice, such sorting may be imperfect due to adverse selection 
risk, fixed costs of operating plans, and social preferences (e.g., as mandated or imposed by Federal 
or State government) for some minimum level of coverage for all.  
 
For public plans, the budget may be fixed in the short run but in the longer can be changed by 
Congress.  The threshold could be a way of eliciting taxpayers ? WTP for different levels of tax funding 
or health care budgets that enable different levels of coverage generosity. As noted earlier, in the 
short run (within a budget period), the threshold could reflect the value (i.e., opportunity cost) of 
the marginal technology displaced if a new technology were to be adopted in the context of a fixed 
budget: this is, in technical terms, the  “shadow price ? of the relevant budget constraint in the 
jurisdiction concerned. It is a measure of the health gain forgone if an established technology is 
displaced. In the longer run, use of either a WTP or an opportunity-cost approach should yield the 
same threshold if the system has been implemented to perfectly match population preferences, 
income, ĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂŶƚƐŽĨƚĂǆƉĂǇĞƌ ?ďĞŶĞĨŝĐŝĂƌŝĞƐ ?tdWĨŽƌŚĞĂůƚŚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚŝƐƉƵďůŝĐ
program.   An expansion of the set of available technologies may change the opportunity cost in the 
short run, as discussed below in Section 4.3 on Affordability. 
 
It is sometimes suggested that the health budget and/or threshold be set in some relation to the 
GDP per capita in the jurisdiction concerned, reflecting the evidence that richer countries typically 
devote more of their wealth to health care, or reflecting an aspiration of the amount that countries 
should spend on health care [5].  This GDP-based approach may be a useful rough guideline for 
broad comparisons across countries. However, actual decisions in individual countries reflect 
ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?WTP for health for themselves and others, which depends on many factors besides income, 
including tastes, politics, and the efficiency of tax-financed spending. 
 
In a setting where health budgets can be easily increased, the approach for determining the 
threshold is more complex, especially in situations where there is considerable patient copayment 
with no stop-loss on patient cost-sharing and where payers may stipulate limits on coverage for 
certain services. In theory, information on ĞŶƌŽůůĞĞƐ ? ?ƚĂǆƉĂǇĞƌƐ ?WTP is relevant since one option 
when considering whether or not to adopt a technology would be to consider immediately 
increasing the budget for health care, by raising insurance premiums and/or patient copayments. An 
opportunity cost of adopting a new technology still exists, but instead of falling in the health care 
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sector, it would fall on other private consumption or on non-health public services or on future 
generations through public budget deficits, depending on how the funds to pay for the new 
technology are ultimately raised. Such a context is potentially problematic if the interests of those 
parties who end up bearing at least part of the cost are ignored in the decision making with regard 
to setting (or ignoring) thresholds and spending constraints, as occurs if budgets are poorly defined.  
 
4.3 Affordability 
 
Whether we are examining   ?ŝ ?ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?ďƵĚŐĞƚĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐĨŽƌƉƵƌĐŚĂƐŝŶŐƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚƐŽƌƚŚŝƌĚ-
party insurance, or (ii) third-party (whether private, social, or tax-ďĂƐĞĚ ?ŝŶƐƵƌĞƌƐ ?ďƵĚŐĞƚ
constraints, plan members in practice choose to place a rough limit or budget on their spending on 
medical care during a given year.  This reflects their preferences for medical care vs. other non-
health goods and services, which may of course change as the range of health and non-health 
technologies changes over time. The budget is expressed in the premiums they are willing to pay for 
private insurance or the taxes they are willing to pay for public or social insurance in a given year. 
The budget may in part depend on the ability or cost to the individual or third-party payer of 
borrowing across time periods and, in the case of public payers, any intergenerational implications 
of unfunded liabilities. 
   
As discussed in 4.2, in theory ƚŚĞƉĂǇĞƌ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞďƵĚŐĞƚ ?tdWƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚ, and services 
reimbursed are simultaneously determined and are adjusted over time, as changes occur in 
consumer incomes, in health technologies, and in non-health consumption opportunities. Most new 
value-creating medical technologies can be accommodated by the displacement of older, inferior 
technologies and/or by growth of health budgets with income. However, some new services may 
meet the cost-effectiveness threshold but have a sufficiently large budget impact that they raise 
issues of affordability.   
 
&ŽƌŵĂůůǇ ?ǁĞĚĞĨŝŶĞ “ĂĨĨŽƌĚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ĂƐbeing relevant if paying for all patients potentially eligible for a 
ŶĞǁƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚĨŽƌĐĞĞŝƚŚĞƌĂŶŽǀĞƌƌƵŶŽĨƚŚĞƉĂǇĞƌ ?ƐƉůĂŶŶĞĚďƵdget or displacement of 
other treatments regarded as being cost-effective. (This discussion thus does not address cases 
ǁŚĞƌĞ “ĂĨĨŽƌĚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŝƐƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůy a strategic argument in negotiations between payers and providers 
over price.) ^ƵĐŚ “ƵŶĂĨĨŽƌĚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? is most likely to occur if a new drug or drug class is highly 
effective such that it can justify a relatively high value-based price and also affects a large patient 
population. Recently, affordability has, for example, been a concern for drugs to treat hepatitis C. It 
ŚĂƐĂůƐŽďĞƌĂŝƐĞĚĂƐĂƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĨŽƌĐĂƌĚŝŽǀĂƐĐƵůĂƌĚŝƐĞĂƐĞŽƌůǌŚĞŝŵĞƌ ?Ɛ disease, and could 
also be a concern if a large number of high-priced orphan drugs came to market in quick succession, 
as could occur given the current pipeline of compounds with orphan status targeting cancer.  
 
/ĨƚŚĞƉĂǇĞƌ ?ƐďƵĚŐĞƚŝƐĨŝǆĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƐŚŽƌƚƌƵŶ, being spent efficiently, and, by assumption, cannot 
accommodate all existing services and the new service meets the current threshold, then in principle 
the threshold should be adjusted:  this is sometimes called an  “infra-marginal adjustment. ? This 
would call for elimination of those treatments that are no longer cost-effective at the new, lower 
threshold.  (Of course, if lower prices can be negotiated with suppliers of these services, this would 
mitigate the need for quantity adjustments.) However, an important consideration may be the 
adjustment costs of disinvesting and switching resources into new uses, which could include 
changing protocols, withdrawing services, or switching patients to alternative regimens, which may 
entail budget, time, and health adjustment costs.   
 
The optimal short-run adjustment would thus weigh the benefits and costs, including adjustment 
costs, of either discontinuing some existing treatments or deferring the treatment of some patients 
with the new drug. In practice, such budget challenges can often be handled at the margin by 
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stratifying patients eligible for the new drug, focusing immediate treatment on those at significant 
risk of disease progression, while deferring treatment of those at early stages and at low risk of 
disease progression in the short run. Such delay in treating diseases that progress slowly may incur 
minimal health loss or adjustment costs, compared to the alternative of discontinuing other, existing 
treatments that meet the cost-effectiveness threshold but whose treatment interruption would 
incur significant adjustment costs. Delay in treating early-stage patients with the new technology 
also allows time for the entry of alternative, competing technologies, which may offer additional 
benefits and/or compete on price (as occurred recently with new hepatitis C medicines). In the long 
run, new technologies that meet cost-effectiveness thresholds are optimally absorbed by some 
combination of:  expansion of budgets ŝĨŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ?ďƵƚŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞ “ĐƵƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐƚŚĂƚ
create budget pressure in the short run, such as hepatitis C treatment, may reduce long term 
expenditures); possible threshold adjustment; and/or discontinuance of existing treatments that are 
rendered less cost-effective by the launch of superior new technologies.  
 
Because affordability can cause significant adjustment and other costs, some payers estimate the 
expected budget impact of a new technology, along with its value, as part of the coverage decision 
process. Estimating and planning for budget impact can be prudent and can facilitate some of the 
adjustments to minimize disruptions mentioned above, such as staging the adoption of a new 
technology with a large potential budget impact. However, we do not recommend considering 
budget impact as an integral part of value assessment itself or structuring/requiring an automatic 
discount linked to budget impact, or introducing an inverse relationship between value and budget 
impact.  Even if the potential level of investment requires considering an infra-marginal adjustment 
of the threshold, such an adjustment in the threshold should be considered separately, not as an 
integral part of value assessment. Although it might seem logical that a lower threshold should be 
used for drugs to treat very large populations, such an inverse relationship between threshold (and 
implicitly, reimbursed price) and target population would make sense only if WTP thresholds were 
designed mainly to pay for R&D and R&D costs were invariant across drugs. However, in general we 
have argued that thresholds should reflect value and WTP of consumers, not costs to producers. 
Whether producers can develop drugs that meet payer and consumer WTP thresholds is a matter 
for them. This argues against structuring an inverse relation between thresholds and budget impact.  
 
4.4 Potential Threshold and Decision Modifiers  
 
Even in cases where decision makers operate with an explicit threshold, a deliberative process (see 
Section 5) is typically followed, in which other modifying factors may be applied [2]. Many of these 
factors mirror the elements of value discussed in Section 3 [6]. The objective is not to maximize 
health alone, but to consider other health-related elements of value and to consider who might be 
getting the health gain.  For example, as mentioned above, NICE operates with an end-of-life 
criterion, whereby the expert committee can increase the value of the QALYs gained, hence raising 
the effective threshold for adoption of the technology to £50,000 per QALY in order to reflect 
ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚ ?in some circumstances, health gain at the end of life is worth more to individuals 
than at other points in their lives [7]. The Scottish Medicines Consortium identifies several 
 ?ŵŽĚŝĨŝĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŵĂǇũƵƐƚŝĨǇ accepting a higher cost per QALY gained [8]. These include, but are not 
limited to, evidence of a substantial improvement in life expectancy or quality of life (reflecting 
ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?ƐƚĞƉ-ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶs), evidence that the medicine can be targeted at a sub-group of 
patients that may derive specific or extra benefit (possibly reflecting severity of disease), absence of 
other therapeutic options of proven benefit (e.g., at end of life), or possible bridging to another 
definitive therapy (possibly reflecting  ?ƌĞĂůŽƉƚŝŽŶǀĂůƵĞ ?ĂŶĚ ?ǀĂůƵĞŽĨŚŽƉĞ ? ?. 
 
Evidentiary Uncertainty as a Modifier 
 
 6 
When assessing a new medical technology, decision makers struggle with uncertainty and with how 
much evidence to collect. Evidence collection costs money and takes time, during which a medicine 
may not be given to patients, some of whom could benefit, while others may avoid risks. Thus, in 
general, additional evidence should only be sought as part of a value assessment if the expected 
benefit of evidence collection, in terms of the value of reduced uncertainty, exceeds the costs.   
 
It is important to separate whether decision makers are concerned about uncertainty because: (i) it 
means the health system may adopt a technology that turns out to be poor value for money on 
average, or alternatively, not adopt one that looked to be poor value for money but actually 
provided a lot of benefit at a cost-effective price; or (ii) there is real risk to health, that some 
patients may have been harmed by being treated. These are both valid but have different 
implications for value assessment. In relation to achieving value for money, we might expect 
decision makers to be risk neutral, and look for a positive expected net benefit over cost, taking 
account of the threshold. In relation to uncertainty about the incremental health effect (including 
any downside risks to health from adverse events), however, decision makers may then be expected 
to be risk-averse on behalf of patients. Hence, the common use of a p-value of 0.05 for evidence of 
expected positive health effect, rather than a much higher p-value of 0.5 which is implicit in our 
assumption of risk neutrality in payer assessment of value for money. Thus, payers (and HTA bodies 
operating as their agents) typically use a two-stage approach, using one hurdle for evidence of 
clinical benefit and another for evidence of value for money.  
 
In the context of the value-for-money assessment, the issue of a price adjustment for uncertainty 
arises. Any price adjustment for uncertainty in a value assessment should meet the requirement 
that, in the absence of the price adjustment, the expected benefit of evidence collection (in terms of 
the value of reduced uncertainty) must exceed the costs. Thus, if uncertainty cannot be reduced at 
an acceptable cost, it becomes irrelevant to value-for-money decision making. If uncertainty can be 
reduced by further evidence collection or simply the passage of time, then the decision maker could 
require evidence collection or make the price contingent on the actual outcomes observed over 
time. The appropriate decision will depend on the institutional context and on costs of administering 
such contingent contracts [9]. 
 
We note that there may be separate issues of uncertainty about the budget constraint, optimal 
threshold, and/or opportunity cost estimate that should be used in decision making. So we have, in 
principle, uncertainty about our estimate of the incremental effectiveness and value of the 
technology and uncertainty around our estimate of our value for money or budget hurdle.  This 
second issue has begun to be discussed in the literature, but we do not pursue it here [10-12].  
  
4.5 Application in the US 
 
In this section, we further elaborate on how these concepts might be applied in the US which is a 
pluralistic health care system with multiple private and public health plans. Different health plans 
could choose different thresholds, reflecting the differing WTP of their enrollees and, to the extent 
that the plan benefits from tax-financing, the WTP of taxpayers.  Payers ? both private and public ?
are thus agents for their enrollees or taxpayers. In making coverage decisions, a payer perspective is 
used, which reflects the average preferences of their enrollees/taxpayers. The individual patient 
perspective becomes relevant for patients and their doctors when making choices between covered 
technologies or treatment options.  
 
Private sector employer-sponsored plans. These plans can in theory freely choose their threshold 
WTP and implied premium cost as elements of competitive plan design. The threshold and premium 
in theory depend on the WTP for health (relative to other goods) of their employees. But the fact 
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that workforce composition can change over time (and sometimes is purposely changed by owners 
by altering the type of benefits) makes these relationships difficult to measure in practice. However, 
because the open-ended tax subsidy means that part of cost of choosing a more generous threshold 
is shifted to taxpayers, either a cap on the tax exclusion or a tax on insured health expenditures that 
exceed some threshold is appropriate.  
 
In the treatment decisions of individual patients, plan administrators, and providers should take into 
account individual patient preferences among alternative technologies that meet the collectively-
determined threshold. If a patient wants a technology that does not meet the plan threshold, it 
would not be reimbursed. He or she could pay wholly out of pocket ? but is unlikely to do so unless 
ƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐtdWŝƐŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚ ? A variation of this would be for the threshold value 
to be paid for by the plan with the balance required to be paid for by the patienƚ ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ? “ďĂůĂŶĐĞ
ďŝůůŝŶŐ ? ? 
 
Medicaid and other fully tax-subsidized programs. We assume that such programs are funded by 
Federal and State taxpayers out of altruistic and equity concerns of taxpayers for program recipients. 
Taxpayer equity concerns may also include a Rawlsian approach as to what provision for the most 
disadvantaged people (in terms of both health needs and income) they would want to have 
provided. /ĨƐŽ ?ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵďƵĚŐĞƚƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚƚĂǆƉĂǇĞƌƐ ?WTP for such programs and to pay higher taxes 
for better health outcomes for people on low incomes or otherwise disadvantaged in access to 
health care. Thresholds are defined by opportunity cost of resource use within the program. In 
treatment decisions of individual patients, their preferences among approved treatment options 
should be taken into account.  
 
Medicare. Medicare is a hybrid that is financed largely by current taxpayers, with some 
contributions from current beneficiaries (current payments for Parts B and D and past contributions 
to Part A), and some shifting of unfunded liabilities to undefined future taxpayers. In theory, the 
budget and threshold should reflect some average of the WTP of taxpayers and beneficiaries.  In 
ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐƚŚĂƚ
meet the threshold should be taken into account.  
 
4.6 The Excess Burden of Tax-Financed Public Spending  
 
When taxpayers provide much of the funding for a public insurance program that pays for a new 
technology, the full societal opportunity cost of raising that funding should ideally be taken into 
account, along with any benefits of using the public rather than the private sector. To date, 
conventional CEA of new medical technologies has not addressed this issue raised in public finance 
economics.  One generally accepted conclusion from public finance is that all tax bases except for 
ůƵŵƉƐƵŵƚĂǆĞƐŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞ “ĞǆĐĞƐƐďƵƌĚĞŶ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĂůƐŽĐĂůůĞĚ “ĚĞĂĚǁĞŝŐŚƚůŽƐƐ ? ?t> ? ?  Excess 
burden refers to the distortion that arises as an individual is discouraged from an efficient activity 
that would also increase his or her share of the tax base.  Thus, a worker may be discouraged from 
working additional hours or switching to a better paid but higher productivity job, an investor may 
be discouraged from a profitable investment, and everyone is encouraged to hire more tax 
accountants. The reason why behavior is changed is because it is behavior that would otherwise 
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐƐŚĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĂǆďĂƐĞĂŶĚŚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚĂǆĞƐ ?dŚĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĂƚ ?ĞǀĞŶŝĨƚŚĞ
person attaches a very high value to the public activity that would be financed with the taxes, unless 
the person controls a very large share of the base he or she would ordinarily think that the amount 
of the public good in question would be unchanged by an individual decision.  Rather than increase 
ŽŶĞ ?ƐƐŚĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĂǆĞƐƚŽĨŝŶĂŶĐĞƐŽŵĞƉƌĂŝƐĞǁŽƌƚŚǇƉƵďůŝĐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇďƵƚǁŝƚŚŶŽĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂďůĞĐŚĂŶŐĞ
in the amount of that activity, the person may decide to forgo the efficient choice.  If all taxpayers 
try to reduce their shares at the expense of others, all cut back and all lose. 
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The size of the excess burden depends on the elasticity of response of the taxed activity to a tax.  It 
is higher for tax bases that are more easily altered (like investment in or purchase of specific 
commodities like sugary drinks).  Empirical estimates of the burden as a percentage of funds 
collected range from 20 to 60% (but are almost never negligible [13].  There have been some 
calculations made of the excess burden of financing medical care in the US, along with the 
conjecture that smaller programs will be chosen if the tax base has higher elasticity (like the income 
tax compared to the payroll tax) [14]. 
 
Assuming a significant excess burden of taxes to fund health care, in theory we may need to 
consider whether the threshold for public spending should be adjusted upward to reflect excess 
burden.  However, such an adjustment is not appropriate if there are different but offsetting 
distortions in providing private insurance, as discussed next.  
 
The usual assumption is that there is no excess burden for privately financed care, though if an 
employer imposed more of the cost of a group insurance benefit on workers as their earnings rose 
there would be a distortion compared to a situĂƚŝŽŶǁŚĞƌĞĞĂĐŚǁŽƌŬĞƌ ?ƐǁĂŐĞŝƐƌĞĚƵĐĞĚďǇĂůƵŵƉ
ƐƵŵĂŵŽƵŶƚƚŽĨŝŶĂŶĐĞƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌƉƌĞŵŝƵŵƐŚĂƌĞ ?dŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞ ?ƐĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚƉƌĞŵŝƵŵƐŚĂƌĞŝƐ
rarely tied to wages (although occasionally it is) so any excess burden from this source would be 
rare.  
 
However, because employer plans reflect collective choices and each employer can only offer a 
limited number of plans (due to tax, fixed costs and adverse selection concerns), the employer 
plan(s) on offer to individual employees may diverge significantly from eĂĐŚĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞ ?Ɛ preferred 
plan. This divergence between their cost (in terms of forgone wages plus employee premium 
contribution) and their perceived value of the plan acts like a  “tax ? on purchasing employer-
sponsored private insurance that should in theory be considered, analogous to the excess burden on 
public insurance. On the other hand, to the extent that the collective choice of employer plans 
operates to reduce adverse selection risk, this is a mitigating factor.   
 
Further, in the case of publicly funded programs like Medicare and Medicaid, it could be argued that 
these were established as public programs specifically because taxpayers wanted to provide health 
care for the elderly and poor, and deemed that such coverage could be provided more cheaply and 
equitably by the government than by the private sector (due to adverse selection in private 
provision and free riding in voluntary financing of such programs). If so, they may rationally not view 
the taxes paid to support these programs as a DWL. Even if each taxpayer thinks their 
own contribution is negligibly small, everyone knows that free riding would undermine voluntary 
altruism, and that overcoming this effect is a benefit of using the tax system.  
 
These considerations suggest at a minimum that different taxpayers may have different views of the 
DWL and the value of paying taxes to fund public health programs. Similarly, employees may have 
different views of the value to them of paying for employer-sponsored private insurance. Given the 
many unknowns, on balance at this stage, it is unclear what adjustments for distortions, if any, are 
appropriate for setting thresholds for public or for private insurance.   
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
We have several clear recommendations based on the discussion in this section.  Each payer should 
adopt a decision rule about what is good value for money given their budget. Consistent use of a 
cost-per-QALY threshold will assure the maximum health gain for the budget. In the US, different 
public and private insurance programs could use different thresholds, reflecting the differing 
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generosity of their budgets and implying different levels of access to technologies. In addition, 
different insurance plans could consider different additional elements to the QALY metric discussed 
above and in Section 5. Issues related to the affordability of healthcare technology are most 
efficiently addressed by considering both (a) the adjustment costs of reducing spending on, or 
replacing, existing technologies, (b) the impact of delaying or staging implementation of new 
technologies, and (c) the cost-effectiveness ratios of new and existing technologies. Over time, the 
availability of new technologies may increase the amount that populations want to spend on health 
care. Fundamentally, budgets and thresholds must continually be brought into alignment. Thus, as 
payers consider adding coverage of new technologies or new elements to the measure of benefits, 
implications for budgets and/or thresholds must simultaneously be considered in order to bring 
opportunity costs, thresholds, and health expenditures into alignment.  
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